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I. Introduction 
 The advent of the digital age and its subsequent proliferation have rapidly reshaped 
society, forever altering how individuals interact with the world and one another on a daily basis.  
Social media in particular has significantly transformed societal norms, as people the world over 
have been forced to adapt to constantly changing technology and the consequences that 
accompany it.  After breaking down the barriers of nearly all facets of everyday life, it is of no 
surprise that social media has now infiltrated the confines of the courtroom, and in particular 
civil litigation.  While individuals take full advantage of social media sites to voice their opinions 
and share the minutia of their daily lives, once an opposing party seeks to pry into these 
accounts, privacy concerns are quickly raised.  This new and developing technology is now 
challenging courts throughout the country to balance these privacy concerns with an established 
affinity for broad pretrial discovery.  The resulting balancing process is creating a legal and 
ethical minefield for practicing attorneys seeking access to this information.   
As the Ninth Circuit aptly stated, “[t]he Internet has opened new channels of 
communication and self-expression…  While such intermediaries enable the user-driven digital 
age, they also create new legal problems.”1  Given the rise of social media, lawyers practicing in 
all fields have been forced to acquire a better understanding of the resource or risk substantial 
                                                          
1
 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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harm to their clients.  Attempts to excavate useful information from the social media landscape 
have raised new concerns about attorney ethics and the rules of discovery, which were drafted 
decades ago before technology like this was even conceived let alone commonplace.  A relative 
lack of consistent judicial precedent on the discoverability of such evidence has not hindered the 
development of the use of social media information in litigation, as evidenced by the 88 
published opinions this past September alone in which evidence mined from social media was of 
critical importance.
2
  
While no hard line rules currently exist for evidence taken from social media platforms, a 
common theme does seem to be shared among the jurisdictions that have dealt with the issue: 
individuals who willingly choose to share information with others on platforms designed to 
broadcast these postings into cyberspace cannot rightfully seek shelter behind privacy concerns 
when those postings later prove damaging.  The broad latitude afforded litigants by the current 
rules of discoverability and the traditional preference for broad pretrial discovery have been used 
to justify intrusions into both the public and private sectors of individuals’ social media profiles.  
With the constant and rapid transformation of technology and the advent of products such as 
Google Glass, there may come a time when new discovery rules may have to be drafted, rules 
that are specifically geared toward social media.  Rules that are centrally focused on social media 
would allow for uniformity, practicality, and comprehensibility, while also bringing an end to the 
bevy of litigation that is currently plaguing the judicial system.  For now, however, courts seem 
complacent to use the existing rules of discovery and the rules of professional conduct to answer 
the questions of what content is discoverable and how that content can be discovered legally and 
ethically.  
                                                          
2
 John Patzakis, Social Media Case Law Update: The Acceleration Continues, Next Generation eDiscovery Law & 
Tech Blog (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:42 AM), http:// blog.x1discovery.com/2013/10/04/social-media-case-law-update-the-
acceleration-continues. 
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II. What is Social Media? 
 According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, social media refers to “electronic 
communication through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, 
personal messages, and other content.”3  The American Bar Association has defined social media 
more broadly as “any tool or service that uses the internet to facilitate conversations.”4  
Regardless of the definition, it is clear that the phrase encompasses social networking sites like 
Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn, blogs, forums, photo-sharing sites like Flickr, and video-
steaming websites like internet giant YouTube.  Social media as a digital platform for social 
interaction is a relatively young phenomenon but has experienced explosive growth over the last 
decade.  It has never been more popular than it is today.  As of March 2013, Facebook, which is 
not even ten years old yet, had 1.11 billion active users, with 699 million of these users posting 
on average at least once per day.
5
  Moreover, there have been over 170 billion tweets since 2006, 
and over 6 billion hours of video are watched each month on YouTube with 100 hours of video 
being uploaded to the site every minute.
6
  As the sheer number of social media platforms and 
their popularity continue to rise, understanding the nature and functions of the tools at the core of 
the phenomenon has been crucial to a legal community lambasted with legal and ethical issues.  
Social media websites exist primarily to foster and enhance open communication.  The 
unrestricted and public nature of services like Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter, allow and 
encourage users to instantaneously communicate and share information with not only their 
                                                          
3
 Social Media Definition, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited    December 3, 2013). 
4
 Catherine Sanders Reach, A Guided Tour of Social Media, Am. Bar Ass'n Legal Tech. Res. Ctr., 2 (2010), http://   
apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/lpl/downloads/a_guided_tour_of_social_ media.pdf. 
5
 Kim Garst, Social Media Grows Up, HuffingtonPost.com (Sept. 11, 2013, 12:37 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kim-garst/social-media-grows-up_b_3906360.html (last visited December 3, 
2013). 
6
 Doug Gross, Library of Congress Digs into 170 Billion Tweets, CNN.com (Jan. 7, 2013, 12:18PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/07/tech/social-media/library-congress-twitter (last visited December 3, 2013); 
Statistics, YouTube.com, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited December 3, 2013). 
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personal friends but also acquaintances and the general public as well.  Today, information that 
was once considered private is being broadcasted via social media to an entire world of strangers.  
By promoting the public exposure of thoughts, feelings, and other personal content, the 
fundamental nature and characteristics of social media make it a ripe treasure trove of 
information for attorneys in all fields of practice. 
 Social media not only promotes the sharing of information and open dialogue, but 
generally, this personal information is recorded and stored, sometimes permanently.  
Furthermore, each posting is often stamped with a date, time, and location of the individual at the 
time of posting.  These features can give lawyers unfettered access to a bevy of information that 
is easy to quickly collect, store, and interpret.  With this information readily available at the click 
of a mouse, what once could only be discovered through a lengthy and potentially arduous 
process, can now be found by combing through a collection of documents that can be 
downloaded in mere seconds.  Even though the source of this information is rapidly advancing 
and groundbreaking technology, until now courts have chosen to use the existing rules of 
discovery to determine what evidence can be subjected to discovery in civil litigation. 
III. The Existing Rules of Discovery 
 In response to a wildfire of issues concerning electronically stored information, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 2006 to better handle issues regarding 
computer-based discovery.  Rather than following this path and drafting new rules, lawmakers 
have instead chosen to allow courts to mold social media issues into the existing discovery rules.  
These courts have generally refused to look upon this type of evidence any differently than its 
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predecessors.  As one court stated, “[t]he fact that the [d]efendant is seeking social networking 
information as opposed to traditional discovery materials does not change the Court’s analysis.”7 
The current rules of discovery, both in New Jersey and at the federal level, are broad-
sweeping rules that favor the admissibility of pretrial evidence.  These rules focus on the content 
of the information sought as opposed to the information’s source.  Given that the rules were 
drafted to be purposefully broad, they often offer courts little guidance when determining 
whether certain evidence is properly discoverable.  The gatekeeping function these rules were 
meant to serve has thus been significantly nullified by broad judicial interpretation that has 
afforded litigants wide latitude in the pretrial discovery process under the supposition that this 
better serves equality and the judicial process as a whole.   
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, whether or not evidence is discoverable ultimately 
breaks down into an issue of relevancy.  According to Rule 26(b), “any nonprivileged matter that 
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense is discoverable.”8  Basically, if the information being 
sought is relevant to the claims or defenses of the parties to the case, then it should be 
discoverable.  At the pretrial stage this creates an incredibly vast scope of information that must 
be turned over to the opposing party.   
 Similar to the broad federal rules of discovery, New Jersey’s discovery rules are to be 
construed liberally in favor of broad pretrial discovery.
9
  The primary rule of discovery in New 
Jersey is Rule 4:10-2 which reads: 
                                                          
7
 Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 11-6323 ADS AKT, 2013 WL 2897054 
(E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013) citing EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010) 
(“Discovery of [social networking postings] requires the application of basic discovery principles in a novel 
context.”). 
8
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
9
 See Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50 (1976) (“Our court system has long been committed to the view that essential 
justice is better achieved when there has been full disclosure so that the parties are conversant with all the available 
facts.”).   
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Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope 
of discovery is as follows: 
(a) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the 
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other 
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons 
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the 
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; nor is it ground for 
objection that the examining party has knowledge of the matters as to which discovery is 
sought.
10
 
Under the rule, courts possess the power to order a party to produce all relevant, unprivileged 
information which could potentially lead to the discovery of relevant evidence.
11
  While this 
seemingly provides the court with broad-sweeping powers, a significant shortcoming of the 
rule’s language is that it fails to define the term “relevant” which is vital to a proper 
understanding of the rule’s scope.  Under N.J.R.E. 401, however, relevant evidence is defined as 
“evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the 
determination of the action.”12  Therefore, in order to establish that evidence is discoverable at 
the state or federal level, a party must simply satisfy the rather low burden of demonstrating that 
the evidence is somehow relevant to the issues involved in the case.   
IV. Relevancy in the Social Media Landscape 
Because of the sheer amount of information contained in a litigant’s social media accounts, 
asking a party to turn over the entirety of his or her account will no doubt produce both relevant 
and irrelevant evidence.  Courts cannot rightfully ask a litigant to turn over all of this irrelevant 
information, and they are therefore struggling with delineating the scope of relevancy as it 
pertains to social media evidence.  Even though it is has been established that there is no 
Facebook privilege or privacy expectation in social media postings, a party seeking access to an 
                                                          
10
 N.J. CT. R. 4:10-2(a). 
11
 See Huie v. Newcomb Hospital, 112 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 1970). 
12
 N.J.R.E. 401. 
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adversary’s social media footprint must still establish that the desired information is relevant or 
will lead to the discovery of relevant evidence.  This relevancy standard has created a bevy of 
litigation with parties ardently disputing whether certain postings or messages fall under the 
standard’s purview.   
A. Who Determines Relevancy 
 Federal Rule 26(b) and the discovery rules of many states, as exemplified by New 
Jersey’s Rule 4:10, hinge the discoverability of evidence on the issue of relevance.  While this 
may be clear from a plain reading of the rules, what often remains unclear is who determines 
what is relevant to the issues and defenses of the case.   
 When an opposing party requests access to evidence located in an adversary’s social 
media accounts, it is often done so through the typical document request for the production of 
materials.  According to common practice, this means that the party producing the requested 
documents reviews them prior to turning them over, making an initial determination of relevancy 
as the party will only turn over documents he or she feels are relevant to the case, and 
specifically the document request.  Thus, in a typical case relevancy is determined by the 
producing party, at least initially.  Allowing the producing party to initially determine relevance 
has proven to be a more favorable alternative than forcing that party to needlessly turn over a 
mass of information for the adversary to rummage through freely.  While this may seem sensible, 
the process can often become problematic because even the most honest party may seek to hide 
certain postings under the veil of irrelevance.   
When the issue of relevancy becomes contentious, however, courts can be forced to 
supervise the discovery process by determining what is relevant, often through in camera 
reviews of the materials.
13
  Although this ensures that the proper evidence is turned over to the 
                                                          
13
 Bianca v. North Fork Bancorp, 2012 WL. 5199007 (N.Y. 2012). 
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opposing party, judicial supervision of this nature cannot be relied upon as a steadfast measure 
for determining relevancy.  Such a process is too judicially time-consuming and expensive to be 
used in every case involving social media evidence.  The litigation process must instead be able 
to rely on the honest production of relevant evidence, as determined by the adversaries 
themselves, with judicial assistance given only on an as-need basis.   
 
 
B. Relevancy and Social Media Evidence 
 
Even though the parties initially determine relevancy, courts have been inundated with 
social media discovery disputes concerning the relevancy of account information and the 
corresponding postings within those accounts.  The relevancy standard has proven a rather low 
hurdle for parties looking to access an adversary’s social media postings, but at the same time 
has also prevented carte blanche invasions of privacy.  An adversary does not have the ability to 
force the production of all social media evidence.  It must limit that discovery to content that is 
relevant to the case.  Courts are currently defining the scope of relevance with regards to social 
media evidence, and, unsurprisingly, many have come to varying conclusions. 
An Indiana court recently defined the scope of relevancy for social media discovery as 
“any profile, postings, or messages (including status updates, wall comments, causes joined, 
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) and social networking site applications for the 
claimant… that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion, feeling, or mental state, as well as 
communications that reveal, refer, or relate to events that could reasonably be expected to 
produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state.”14  The defendant employer sought access 
to two employees’ Facebook profiles after the E.E.O.C. brought suit for sexual harassment on the 
                                                          
14
 E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt, LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 437 (S.D. Ind. 2010).   
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employees’ behalves.15  In limiting the scope of discoverability, the court recognized that 
discovery does have limits and “the challenge is to define appropriately broad limits – but limits 
nevertheless – on the discoverability of social communications in light of a subject as amorphous 
as emotional and mental health…”16  The court also stated that a picture posted on a third-party’s 
profile in which a litigant is merely tagged in, is less likely to be relevant to the case at hand, 
while photographs or videos of third-parties, unrelated to the case at hand, are most likely 
irrelevant.
17
 
 Similarly, the Eastern District of New York has recognized that the broad nature of 
relevancy must be somewhat restrained when confronted with a motion to compel seeking to 
force the plaintiff to release all records contained in her social networking accounts.
18
  The 
plaintiff attempted to argue that the request violated her privacy rights and was based on nothing 
more than “pure speculation.”19  The defendants, however, contended that the information sought 
reflected the plaintiff’s “levels of social interaction and daily functioning” as well as her 
“emotional and psychological state.”20  After a lengthy discussion of how other jurisdictions had 
managed the issues of social networking discovery and its effect on emotional damages, the 
court concluded that plaintiff’s general postings and “routine updates” were not relevant to her 
claim of emotional damages.
21
  However, the plaintiff was required to produce “any specific 
references to the emotional distress she claims she suffered or treatment she received in 
connection with the incidents underlying her Amended Complaint.”22  In response to plaintiff’s 
claim for physical damages the court held that “[p]ostings or photographs on social networking 
                                                          
15
 Id. at 430. 
16
 Id. at 433. 
17
 Id. at 436. 
18
 Giacchetto, 2013 WL 2897054 at *1. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. at *4. 
22
 Id. 
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websites that reflect physical capabilities inconsistent with a plaintiff’s claimed injury are 
relevant.”23  The court went further to require plaintiff to produce “any social networking 
postings that refer or relate to any of the events alleged in the Amended Complaint.”24 
Courts have continually used the low-burden relevancy standard found within the current 
discovery rules to establish that social media evidence should be treated no differently than 
evidence the court has been confronting for decades.  However, the issue of whether pretrial 
discovery can breach the privacy settings of an individual’s account has raised new concerns and 
somewhat conflicted rulings.   
C. Relevancy and Private Postings 
 While social media users willingly choose to share information online, many do so with 
the belief that they can use privacy settings to control who sees the posted content.  Broad 
pretrial discovery, however, allows adversarial parties to pierce through these privacy settings to 
acquire relevant evidence.  Even though parties may go through great lengths to protect certain 
postings, there is no social media privilege.  Parties to litigation have always been forced to turn 
over incredibly personal, and often intrusive, information including medical records and tax 
returns.  If these materials are not protected discovery, then neither are postings published into 
cyberspace, no matter the privacy settings.  Unless the party can raise a successful claim of 
privilege under Rule 26(c) or parallel state laws, if the information is relevant to the issues at 
hand then it is discoverable.
25
  The general view is that all relevant social media evidence, no 
matter its classification as private or public, is discoverable, but some courts have improperly 
established relevancy thresholds for obtaining this private information.   
                                                          
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 
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 Generally, relevant information, even in the private sections of these accounts is 
discoverable because it is neither privileged nor protected by a common law right of privacy.
26
  
“Merely locking a profile from public access does not prevent discovery.”27  According to the 
New York Supreme Court of Suffolk County, the private information located in the plaintiff’s 
social media accounts is discoverable given the nature of social networking websites.
28
  The 
court recognized that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in postings 
published online and any privacy concerns that could be raised were outweighed by the need for 
information and went against the values of New York’s discovery rules.29  “Preventing 
[d]efendant from accessing to [p]laintiff’s private postings on Facebook and MySpace would be 
in direct contravention to the liberal disclosure policy in New York State.”30  The court also 
acknowledged that the public information on plaintiff’s accounts seemingly contained material 
evidence that contradicted plaintiff’s personal injury claims.31  According to the court, this meant 
a reasonable likelihood existed that the private information of plaintiff’s accounts would contain 
other relevant information.
32
  While the court used this logic to further support its position, other 
courts have taken the private-public dichotomy further by demanding a party show the producing 
party’s public information was relevant before granting access to any private postings.   
These courts create a threshold issue for the discovering party to satisfy: if a party wishes 
to access the private information of the social media account, that party must first establish the 
public parts of the profile contain information relevant to the issues.  The theory seems to be that 
                                                          
26
 See Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 11 CIV. 4374 PGG FM, 2012 WL 1197167, *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. April 5, 
2012); see also Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Mich. 2012).  “The fact that [d]efendant 
is seeking social networking information as opposed to traditional discovery materials does not change the Court’s 
analysis.” 
27
 E.E.O.C., 270 F.R.D. at 434. 
28
 See Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
29
 Id. at 656, citing U.S. v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004).   
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. at 654. 
32
 Id. 
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mere suspicion or speculation that the private contents of an individual’s social media accounts 
contain relevant information is not enough to just the production of such information.
33
  The 
logic involved in these holdings places too heavy a burden on the discovering party, given the 
nature and dichotomy of private and public social media postings.  Generally, information that is 
shared privately is more personal and revealing because the posting party believes he or she is in 
control of the post’s audience.  These postings are more likely to contain relevant information 
with regards to emotional and physical well-being than the generic everyday posts that the user 
wishes to share with the world.  Moreover, some parties may not share any information publicly 
and complete shroud all postings or messages.  Forcing a litigant to meet the threshold showing 
of relevancy as to the public postings improperly parallels the two portions of the adversary’s 
profiles and can prevent the disclosure of pertinent evidence. 
Even though some courts require this threshold showing, judicial precedent has at least 
established that litigants cannot hide their damaging social media postings simply by making 
their accounts private.  At the very most, this process simply creates another hurdle for the 
adversary to overcome during discovery.  Regardless of the select group who has access to the 
private postings, the fact remains that information is being shared on a digital platform.  
Therefore, if the information is relevant, a litigant has a right to access that content. Although the 
information is generally deemed discoverable, as long as the low hurdle of relevancy is met, the 
judicial precedent has established that there is a method to properly obtaining this information 
without clashing with the opposing party or the established values of discovery.   
V. How Social Media Evidence Can Be Discovered Properly 
Given the amount of information available to opposing parties, it is easy to serve an 
opposing party with an overdrawn discovery request that seeks the adversary’s entire social 
                                                          
33
 See Mackelprang v. Fid. Nat. Title Agency of Nevada, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-00788-JCM, 2007 WL 119149 (D. Nev. 
Jan. 9, 2007). 
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media history.  Assuredly, if an attorney were to dig through an adversary’s digital footprint long 
enough he or she would find something relevant to the disputed issues.  However, requesting the 
entirety of an individual’s social media accounts runs afoul of the established principle that 
discovery should not be disproportionate to the needs of the case.  Although this guideline 
appears to be well-established, courts have struggled to establish a definitive scope as to what 
constitutes proper discovery and what crosses that line into the proverbial fishing expedition.   
When confronted with issues of discoverability, courts have consistently reiterated that 
the discovery of social media should be equated with the discovery of other evidence.  These 
courts should therefore hold steadfast to this analogy when determining how that evidence can be 
discovered.  For example, if a party had in its possession handwritten letters that were relevant to 
the claims of the case, that party must turn over those letters in response to a proper discovery 
request.  However, if that party kept those letters in a large box labeled “correspondence” which 
contained all letters that the individual had sent and received over the last several years, that 
individual should not have to turn over the entirety of the box for the opposing party’s search for 
relevant evidence.
34
  An individual should not be forced to turn over such personal information 
just because relevant evidence may exist somewhere in the box.  Similarly, although it is likely 
that a party’s social media accounts contain relevant information, that party should not then be 
forced to turn over the entirety of the social media accounts for the opposing party to rummage 
through freely. 
Although parties are entitled to broad pretrial discovery, they are not entitled to turn the 
discovery process into an invasive, unfocussed expedition based on nothing more than the mere 
                                                          
34
 Steven S. Gensler, Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 7, 15 (2012). 
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suspicion or hope that relevant evidence will turn up eventually.
35
  Neither party has the 
“generalized right to rummage at will through information that Plaintiff has limited from public 
view.
36
  Litigants are best served using a narrowly-tailored discovery request that outlines the 
material being sought and why that material is relevant to the claims of the case.  Courts are 
more apt to respond approvingly of these requests that feature some degree of specificity.   
For example, in Ford v. United States, the government sought an order compelling 
plaintiffs to produce “any documents [,] postings, pictures, messages [,] or entries of any kind on 
social media within the covered period relating to [c]laims by plaintiffs or their [e]xperts.”37  The 
information sought covered the time period between the incident at issue in the matter and the 
date of the discovery request.
38
  The plaintiffs objected to the request claiming that it was 
“invasive, overbroad, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information.”39  
The court recognized that other courts required the production of social media information “in 
response to more narrowly tailored requests, such as those relating to events alleged in the 
complaint.”40  Accordingly, the court found that the government’s request was not narrowly 
tailored because it did not “describe the categories of material sought; rather it reli[ed] on 
[p]laintiffs to determine what might be relevant.  Thus it is overbroad and vague.”41 
 Similarly, in response to a defendant’s discovery request seeking plaintiff’s personal 
emails and messages sent via a private MySpace account, a Nevada court concluded that the 
defendants did not sufficiently establish a relevant basis for acquiring the information other than 
                                                          
35
 Tompkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2012) quoting McCann v. 
Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 910 N.Y.S.2d 614, (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
36
 Id. 
37
 No. CIV. A.DKC11-3039, 2013 WL 3877756 (D. Md. July 25, 2013).   
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at *2. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. 
Richter   15 | P a g e  
 
the “suspicion that they may contain sexually explicit of secually promiscuous content.”42  The 
court reasoned that allowing defendant access to all of the private emails on the plaintiff’s 
MySpace accounts would “cast too wide a net” for information that could be relevant which 
would lead to the production of irrelevant information.
43
  However, the court did find that 
defendant was entitled to seek information relating to plaintiff’s alleged mental condition via 
“properly limited requests for production of relevant email communications.”44   
 Even with broad pretrial discovery, it is clear that parties are not entitled to mine through 
the personal affairs of individuals with nothing more than hopes of finding something relevant.  
Such course of action is unjustifiably intrusive and produces too much irrelevant information. 
Again, it is best for an attorney seeking social media evidence to serve a narrowly-tailored 
request upon the opposing party, rather than utilizing alternative, less favorable means. 
VI. Social Media Content Providers & Their Responses to Discovery Requests 
 Obtaining evidence directly from the social media content provider is rarely, if ever, a 
fruitful endeavor.  Rather than attempting to obtain information directly from the social media 
service, an attorney seeking to uncover the social media exploits of an opposing party should 
direct the corresponding discovery requests directly to opposing counsel.  Without a court order 
or the opposing party’s consent, social media sites are unlikely to respond to any such request.  
This is most likely because these companies go to great lengths to ensure the protection of their 
users’ private information and risk losing members or facing potential litigation if they were to 
compromise that trust.  Instead, companies like Facebook and Twitter direct opposing parties to 
acquire the information they seek from one another, choosing to remove themselves from the 
equation entirely if possible. 
                                                          
42
 Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149 at *2. 
43
 Id. at *7. 
44
 Id. at *8. 
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Although social media content providers have attempted to actively withdraw themselves 
from the discovery process, in response to the escalating use of social media evidence in 
litigation they have developed tools that allow users to easily download the information 
contained within their accounts.  For example, Facebook allows users to download their entire 
account into one file.
45
  This makes for a rather simple process to accumulate information that 
covers the entire span of the user’s profile timeline.  Although lauded for its simplicity, a 
commonly overlooked factor of this option is the sheer breadth of what information is included 
in this material.  The downloaded file contains data of all of the user’s active session on 
Facebook (dates, times, devices, IP addresses), a list of ad topics generated based on information 
mined from your timeline, complete chat histories, and the places you’ve checked into.46  Also 
included are any friend requests sent or received, any friends the user had at any point in time, a 
list of accounts linked to the Facebook account, and any messages the account sent or received 
except those that have been previously deleted.
47
  While it is clear that this information could be 
incredibly useful in litigation, the sheer breadth is overwhelming and involves significant activity 
conducted by third-parties.  When a litigant turns over such downloaded information, he or she is 
also turning over posts, messages, and photos produced by non-parties to the litigation that may 
have their own privacy concerns.   With tools like these available, some courts have disfavored 
claims of that producing evidence from social media accounts is unduly burdensome.
48
 
  Services like Facebook provide these tools to prevent users from being forced into 
turning over their login credentials to another individual.  According to Facebook’s Terms of 
Service, users are not permitted to share their password with a third party or allow a third party 
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to access their account.  Specifically, the terms of service read “You will not share your 
password (or in the case of developers, your secret key), let anyone else access your account or 
do anything else that might jeopardize the security of your account.”49  When a litigation storm 
erupted when employers began delving into the accounts of employees and potential employees, 
Facebook’s Chief Privacy Officer Erin Egan, stated, “[Y]ou should never have to share your 
password, let anyone access your account, or do anything that might jeopardize the security of 
your account or violate the privacy of your friends. We have worked really hard at Facebook to 
give you the tools to control who sees your information.”50  In an era where digital privacy 
concerns are at an all-time high, Facebook and other social media websites have actively 
withdrawn from litigation between third-parties.  Facebook’s stance favoring privacy, however, 
stands in direct contrast with jurisdictions that have forced individuals to turn over their login 
credentials to the opposing party.   
 Moreover, litigants seeking to acquire social media information from the platforms 
themselves can run afoul of the Stored Communications Act.  In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 
Inc., for example, the defendants served subpoenas on third-party websites, including Facebook 
and MySpace, seeking to discover plaintiff’s messages and other related content.51  Although the 
lower court had denied the plaintiff’s motion to quash the subpoenas, the Federal District Court 
for the Central District of California seemed to rule that the private communications that take 
place on social media sites are protected from disclosure by third-parties in civil suits whether or 
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http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited December 3, 2013). 
50
 John G. Browning, With "Friends" Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Passwords, Privacy, and the Discovery of 
Social Media Content, 36 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 505, 534 (2013) citing Erin Egan, Protecting Your Passwords and 
Your Privacy, Facebook (Mar. 23, 2012, 7:32 AM), http://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-and-
privacy/protecting-your-passwords-and-your-privacy/326598317390057. 
51
 See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 968-69 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
Richter   18 | P a g e  
 
not they were disseminated through a public or partially public section of the site.
52
  The court 
reasoned that the social media platforms did fall under the purview of the Act as electronic 
communication services and that the information sought was electronic storage.
53
  Therefore, 
even though the postings could potentially be displayed to a wide audience, the legislative 
history of the statute indicated a desire to “protect the electronic communications that are 
configured to be private, such as private electronic bulletin boards.”54  Although the decision was 
not clear-cut and the reasoning was a bit murky, the Stored Communications Act in general is a 
murky piece of legislation that attorneys should seek to avoid.   
Attorneys should therefore avoid subpoenaing the social media content provider, and 
instead seek the information through other avenues, though there are pitfalls there as well.  
VII. Ethical Issues of Mining Social Media Accounts 
 Attorneys have taken various routes in understanding and utilizing the evidence available 
on social media platforms.  It is of no surprise that some attorneys have taken to scrupulous 
means of acquiring damning evidence against an adversary, while others have held steadfast in 
their ways by ignoring the websites altogether.  As the landscape continues to expand, however, 
ethics committees and bar associations around the country are currently setting the standards for 
practicing in an increasingly digital age, and the process has had far-reaching ramifications for 
all practicing attorneys. 
Given the explosive nature of the content and the novel issues it raises, attorneys have 
clashed with significant ethical issues both in the collection of the evidence and in monitoring 
their clients’ use of social media evidence, which can give rise to spoliation claims.  The most 
                                                          
52
 Id. at 991. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. at 979 citing Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Richter   19 | P a g e  
 
significant of these ethical developments is that lawyers are now being held responsible for 
understanding the technology and its legal implications.   
A. Attorneys Have an Ethical Responsibility to Mine Social Networks 
Social media evidence has reached a stage where it is too significant to ignore.  There is 
now a wealth of evidence that is easily discoverable and potentially determinative of the outcome 
of a case.  The popularity of social media has reached a point where social media discovery 
attempts should now be considered a necessity for any practicing attorney, no matter the field, 
and attorneys that ignore social media evidence can be subjected to charges for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.
55
   
At this point in the digital era, attorneys who fail to search for relevant social media 
evidence or search improperly cannot shield themselves from liability by claiming a lack of 
understanding.  Social media has become such a key issue that attorneys that do not comprehend 
the importance of social media evidence, how to discover it, or the social media activity of their 
clients may be subjected to legal malpractice actions.
56
  Although a malpractice claim would 
only be successful upon a showing that the social media evidence would have made a difference 
in the outcome of the case, ignoring social media poses too substantial a threat to an attorney’s 
reputation and financial well-being.
57
    
In a report filed in May 2012, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 stated that 
technology “has irrevocably changed and continues to alter the practice of law in fundamental 
ways.  Lawyers must understand technology in order to provide clients with the competent and 
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cost-effective services that they expect and deserve.”58  The law is a dynamic field, and although 
the technology is a new phenomenon, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have long held 
attorneys responsible for continually updating their legal education.  According to Model Rule 
1.1, “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent representation 
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for 
representation.”59  Specifically, Comment 6 to the Rule, reads: “To maintain the requisite 
knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, 
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology…”60 Staying “abreast” 
involves understanding technology’s effect on legal research and conducting discovery.61  
“These tasks now require lawyers to have a firm grasp on how electronic information is created, 
stored, and received.”62  According to the Ethics Commission, “a lawyer would have difficulty 
providing competent legal services in today’s environment without knowing how to use email or 
create an electronic document.”63   
In the digital era, it is not surprising that courts are progressively placing duties on 
attorneys to effectively use technology for the benefit of their clients.  At one point in time, using 
the resources of the internet and technology in general was a competitive advantage.  Now, 
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however, it has become mandatory practice.
64
  Attorneys must understand how to use technology 
and must actively convey that knowledge to their clients once litigation has begun.  It is also 
becoming increasingly clear that attorneys must also know how to look for this information 
without being charged with ethics or conduct violations which can be a tricky endeavor given 
recent ethics rulings from several jurisdictions.   
B. Ethically Mining Social Media Websites 
 Given the significance and growth of social media, attorneys must understand the proper 
procedures for discovering the relevant evidence contained therein.  The Rules of Professional 
Conduct currently delineate what an attorney can and cannot do when communicating with 
adversaries and third parties.  These rules are being tested by communications that take place via 
social media platforms, and ethics commissions from multiple states have reached drastically 
different conclusions as to what constitutes proper behavior on social media.   
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been adopted in some form in every state 
except for California.  Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 8.4, a 
lawyer who engages in conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation can be the subject of a 
professional misconduct action.
65
  Specifically, a lawyer cannot “engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”66  Given the focus of the rule on intentional 
deception, it would appear that an attorney sending a friend request to an individual without 
anything more would be free from any potential claims.  After all, the individual receiving the 
request is free to decline it and maintain exclusive control of their information.  However, this is 
not always the case because at least one ethics committee has ruled that the attorney’s hidden 
agenda is controlling.  While it may seem illogical to equate a simple friend request with acts of 
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fraud and deceit, divergent holdings make it unclear whether an attorney has to disclose why that 
individual is receiving the request at issue or be at risk for not disclosing a material fact. 
The Model Rules provide another potential trap for attorneys delving into the digital 
world in search of treasure.  Model Rule 4.2 prohibits any communication between an attorney 
and an adversary known to be represented by another attorney without consent.
67
  While it may 
seem clever to work around this rule by involving the assistance of third-party investigators, 
Rules 5 and 8.4 force attorneys to shoulder the blame for communications made for those 
working under them.  It is important to note, however, that separate rules exist for employees of 
the government or prosecutors who may be permitted to act in undercover investigations to 
discern information. Investigations on social networking websites require the same analysis as 
traditional undercover investigations, but with some new twists, especially regarding the 
propriety of friend requests. 
It seems clear that a Facebook request would fall under the type of communication 
prohibited by the aforementioned rules regarding communications with a represented adversary.  
But this should not stop an attorney from performing social media due diligence to determine if 
the opposing party has publicly available information such as blogs or other postings that could 
be accessed without communicating directly with the opposing party.  Obviously if an attorney 
were to discover pertinent information after running an adversary’s name through the search 
engines available on Google or Facebook, no ethics violations could be raised.  These individuals 
are putting the information out there for the entire world to view so in the eyes of the rules 
governing attorneys it is all fair game, as should be the case.  Additionally, according to at least 
one state’s ethics committee, the simple fact that an attorney has to register on the website or 
create a profile to access the information does not prevent that information from being 
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considered public.
68
  If, however, the targeted individual has set up a network or private profile 
with the very intention of preventing people from viewing his or her profile, then any deceitful 
act of attempting to acquire this information through misrepresentations could potentially open 
the lawyer up to ethics violations.   
 According to the Philadelphia Committee on Legal Ethics, any Facebook friend request 
sent to a third party, even if sent from an honest personal account, is deceptive and in violation of 
Rule 8.4 unless that friend request discloses the attorney is seeking to find information relevant 
to an ongoing case.
69
  According to the committee, an attorney acts deceptively by failing to 
advise the targeted third party of “a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks to 
be allowed access to the witness's pages is doing so only because he or she is intent on obtaining 
information and sharing it with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the 
witness.”70  Although the attorney attempted to argue that viewing the individual’s Facebook 
profile directly compared to the legal and ethical practice of videotaping an individual in public, 
the court found little solace in this comparison because in this case the attorney had to first 
request permission of the targeted individual to access the desired information.
71
  The committee 
stated that deceptively seeking to access the individual’s Facebook profile was similar to the 
attorney wearing a disguise and sneaking into the individual’s home.72  Rather than taking the 
Facebook request at face value, the committee instead chose to focus on the attorney’s hidden 
intent in making the request even though the individual had the power to refuse the request and 
therefore block any type of investigation.
73
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 The San Diego County Bar Association’s Legal Ethics Committee ruled similarly when it 
determined that a lawyer may not ethically make ex parte friend requests to represented third 
parties.
74
  The Committee held that under no circumstances may an attorney friend request a 
represented party’s profile, but that attorney may send a request to an unrepresented individual 
only after disclosing the true nature of the request, i.e. that the request is for litigation purposes.
75
  
Although the attorney was free to access publicly shared information, a line had to be drawn to 
prevent attorneys from “intruding on the attorney-client relationship of opposing parties and 
surreptitiously circumventing the privacy even of those who are unrepresented.”76   
 Viewing the same issue in a completely opposite manner, the New York City Committee 
on Legal Ethics held that no ethical violations occur if an attorney uses a truthful, personal 
account to send a friend request to an unrepresented third party.
77
  Unlike the Philadelphia 
Committee, the New York City Committee found that no material misrepresentations were being 
made because the account contained only truthful information about the attorney and the targeted 
individual had the choice to allow this stranger access to his or her personal information.
78
  
According to his committee, an attorney cannot be found to violate Model Rule 4.1 unless that 
attorney uses a false profile or some form of false information to access the individual’s 
account.
79
 
The Philadelphia Bar Professional Guidance Committee also reiterated the belief that 
these same principles apply to an agent of that attorney who uses a social media account to friend 
the opposing party.  The Committee determined that an attorney acts deceptively if he or she 
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uses a third-party investigator to acquire information from someone using a friend request.
80
  
Although the court recognized that the investigator did not dupe the opposing party into 
accepting the friend request in any way besides sending the invite, deception could be found in 
that the investigator chose to omit “a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks 
to be allowed access to the witness's pages is doing so only because he or she is intent on 
obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony 
of the witness.”81  This ruling is directly in line with the Philadelphia Committee’s prior ruling as 
again an emphasis was placed on the hidden intent of the attorney.   
It is clear that even though most jurisdictions have adopted similar rules of professional 
conduct, the application of those rules varies and attorneys seeking social media discovery must 
be wary of the precedent established in their jurisdictions before taking any course of action.   
C. Maintaining Social Media Evidence: Claims for Spoliation 
With the inadvertent click of a mouse years of relevant evidence can be permanently 
deleted.  When electronic data is involved in litigation, an attorney should take affirmative steps 
to ensure that the evidence is neither destroyed nor altered in any way.  With litigation either 
ongoing or pending, there is a real danger that the adversaries may remove damning content from 
their accounts to better serve their needs.  No matter how damning or embarrassing the evidence 
may be, attorneys are strictly prohibited from destroying evidence.
82
  When this evidence is 
deleted it can give rise to spoliation claims, as exemplified by two recent cases from New Jersey 
and Virginia.   
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In Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., the plaintiff allegedly sustained several injuries as a 
result of an accident caused by defendant United Air Lines.
83
  The plaintiff claimed his injuries 
left him disabled and severely limited his ability to participate in physical and social activities.
84
  
During discovery, the defendants sought information relating to the plaintiff’s Facebook account 
and the plaintiff refused.
85
  Judge Waldor ordered the plaintiff to release the information, and the 
plaintiff acquiesced by changing his password to allow the defendants access to his account.
86
  
The plaintiff, however, deactivated his account shortly thereafter and all of the information was 
permanently lost.
87
  The defendants claimed that what information they did acquire from 
Facebook was contrary to the plaintiff’s injury claims as they showed the plaintiff participating 
in numerous social and physical activities.
88
  The court recognized that the plaintiff’s Facebook 
account was relevant to the litigation because plaintiff alleged to have sustained serious injuries 
that limited his ability to work and engage in certain other physical activities.
89
  While spoliation 
was not an issue in the case, the plaintiff clearly destroyed relevant evidence that could have 
played a role in the outcome of the case.   
If a party to a case purposefully destroys relevant social media evidence, even if acting 
under the advice of counsel, that party and the responsible attorney will be subjected to 
spoliation claims and potentially significant sanctions.  This was the case in Allied Concrete Co. 
v. Lester, where the plaintiff company sought access to the defendant’s Facebook profile and the 
photographs contained within it.
90
  After the plaintiff acquired a photo that portrayed the 
defendant in a poor light, the defendant’s attorney, through a paralegal, instructed the defendant 
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to “clean up” his Facebook page because “[we don’t] want blow ups of other pictures at trial.”91  
The defendant then proceeded to delete a significant number of photographs from his profile.
92
  
Even though these photos were eventually obtained and Lester prevailed at trial, the court 
ordered sanctions in the amount of $180,000 against Lester and $542,000 against his attorneys.
93
   
Besides fines, sanctions for spoliation can include fee-shifting, special jury instructions 
such as adverse inference charges, outright preclusion of certain evidence or issues, or even the 
entry of default judgment or dismissal.  Although not etched in stone, generally, the duty to 
preserve evidence begins before litigation, when litigation is likely.
94
 
VIII.   Issues Arising After the Discovery Phase 
 While determining the discoverability of social media evidence is a daunting task in and 
of itself, it is also a prelude to a much larger battle.  Attorneys must still get this type of evidence 
admitted if they wish to use it at trial.  This evidence must therefore withstand the evidentiary 
rules concerning 403 balancing, hearsay, and the best evidence rule.   This can prove difficult 
given the nature of social media.  Some courts have expressed the view that evidence taken from 
social media accounts possesses no more evidentiary uncertainty than written documents, given 
that written documents and signatures can be easily forged.
95
  Other courts have taken a harder 
look at just how easily social media postings and profiles can be manipulated, requiring the 
proponent of the evidence to establish not only that the postings came from the individual’s 
account, but that they were in fact specifically created by that individual.
96
  Either way, a 
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competent attorney will want to fully understand the steps required to properly authenticate this 
increasingly popular evidence if that attorney wants to realize the full benefit of such material. 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and similar state-specific evidence rules, to admit 
evidence, a litigant must establish that the evidence is (1) relevant, (2) authentic, and (3) not 
subject to being excluded under the hearsay rules.  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b) 
evidence can be authenticated by “[t]estimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be,” or by the 
“[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics taken in 
conjunction with circumstances.”97  Electronically stored information, specifically, can be 
authenticated under Rule 901(b)(4) if the producing party has supporting evidence that shows the 
“contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics” of the evidence.98   
Getting social media evidence admitted into court does not require authentication by a 
representative of the social media service provider.
99
  Messages or postings can be authenticated 
through the testimony of the individual who authored the postings.  The easiest way to properly 
authenticate social media evidence, however, is to obtain an admission from the account holder.  
This can be done through deposition testimony or a notice to admit.  If for some reason this is not 
possible, and the circumstantial evidence of distinguishing characteristics is not sufficient, the 
proponent of the evidence can hire an e-discovery expert to electronically trace the postings.  
This alternative, however, can prove quite time-consuming and significantly expensive.    
 The evidentiary issues surrounding the authentication and admissibility have been best 
represented in criminal cases.
100
  In Griffin v. State, for example, the state attempted to use 
printouts from the MySpace page of the defendant’s girlfriend by having a police officer 
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authenticate the pages.
101
  The postings on the profile allegedly contained threats to eyewitnesses 
of the murder.
102
  The court recognized that “anyone can create a fictitious account and 
masquerade under another person’s name or can gain access to another’s account by obtaining 
the user’s username and password.”103  Even though the profile from which the evidence was 
taken contained the girlfriend’s correct birthday, location, and photographs, the court found that 
the state failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting the evidence because there was a 
possibility that the profile was created by a third party or was hacked by someone at the time of 
the postings.
104
  According to the court, there was too great of a potential for abuse or 
manipulation to admit the evidence.
105
  The court also laid out several alternative methods the 
state could have taken to properly authenticate the postings, including asking the individual if 
she did in fact create the profile and subsequent postings, examining the individual’s laptop and 
internet history, and contacting the social media website directly.
106
   
 Some courts, however, focus on the user’s social media profile and its degree of 
customization or individualization as a means for authenticating the evidence at issue.  
Distinguishing Griffin, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas recently utilized “circumstantial 
indicia of authenticity” to admit disputed MySpace postings.107  Those indicia included 
photographs of the appellant displaying his unique, gang-related tattoos, a registered email 
address that included a nickname the appellant was known to go by, and revealing messages to 
other MySpace users.
108
  Affirming the lower court’s admittance of the evidence, the court 
reasoned that this evidence “taken as a whole with all of the individual, particular details 
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considered in combination” was enough to conclude that the MySpace pages did indeed belong 
to the appellant.
109
  This reasoning was consistent with that displayed by the lower court, which 
ruled: 
“The inherent nature of social networking websites encourages members who choose to 
use pseudonyms to identify themselves by posting profile pictures or descriptions of their 
physical appearances, personal backgrounds, and lifestyles. This type of individualization 
is significant in authenticating a particular profile page as having been created by the 
person depicted in it. The more particular and individualized the information, the greater 
the support for a reasonable juror's finding that the person depicted supplied the 
information.”110 
Getting social media evidence properly authenticated and subsequently admitted at trial 
can be incredibly difficult if the proper precautions are not taken.  Attorneys must be wary of 
these evidentiary hurdles, even if it appears obvious that the individual was responsible for 
publishing the postings or creating the account.  The authentication of such evidence is another 
concern that practicing attorneys must familiarize themselves with in order to properly represent 
their clients in the digital era. 
IX. How to Handle Social Media Issues 
 With new websites popping up every day, the rise of social media is more of a revolution 
than a fad.  Lawyers in all fields must better equip themselves to deal with the issues that arise 
from their clients’ use of these social mediums to better serve them in whatever endeavor.  While 
it would be unethical to advise a client to delete their social media presence, an attorney must 
also be proactive and warn a client that opposing counsel is entitled to this type of evidence if it 
is relevant to the issues at hand.  Forewarning a client that this is a likely possibility will ease the 
potential invasive feelings of having someone dig through one’s online identity.  Social media 
evidence cannot be ignored, but at the same time raises numerous ethical considerations.  This 
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dichotomy can create a fine line around which attorneys must tread lightly whenever social 
media evidence could come into play. 
 For those attorneys seeking to uncover social media evidence from opposing parties, the 
best route is to be as specific as possible in a narrowly-tailored discovery request.  An attorney 
who notifies the opposing party that he or she is searching only for content that is relevant to the 
case at hand will better serve that attorney if complications or objections are raised down the 
line.  Additionally, rather than attempting to acquire the specified party’s login credentials, the 
simpler and more preferred route is to have that party use the tools already available to download 
and then turnover the relevant information.  This way less of an invasion occurs as the opposing 
party remains in control of his or her account and the parties can avoid potential clashes with the 
Stored Communications Act.  Individuals are more apt to turn over information in their exclusive 
control rather than letting multiple individuals peruse through their online accounts, especially 
when their login credentials may include a password that is attached to accounts on different 
websites not relevant to the litigation, such as banking or retail websites.  Furthermore, a 
narrowly-tailored request directed at specific information has a much greater opportunity of 
withstanding any objections under the current discovery rules. 
 In terms of acquiring the information outside the procedural guidelines of the discovery 
rules, an attorney should proceed with caution.  If the information is posted to a public profile, it 
is fair game and an attorney can, and should, extract the postings for relevant evidence.  If, 
however, the information can only be found on a private account, an attorney should look to its 
local or state bar association or similar ethics committees for guidance.  Unless these committees 
have specifically ruled on the issues, the private account is better accessed through more formal 
discovery methods. 
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 Finally, given the constant flow of the digital world, lawyers must stay abreast of what is 
going on in the social landscape and how courts are responding.  Technology and social media 
are rapidly advancing and a website that was not on the scene a year ago could become the next 
social-media goldmine.  An attorney who fails to keep-up could jeopardize their client’s case and 
their own professional well-being under the developing rules of attorney conduct.  Navigating 
the social media minefield may seem daunting, especially for attorneys who do not quite 
comprehend the services.  Because of social media’s explosion, however, it is a necessary evil 
for any attorney.   
X. Remaining Issues 
 Because social media platforms are constantly evolving and changing the ways people 
communicate, it seems that no hardline rules can be drafted that will fully encompass the mass of 
evidence drawn from these accounts.  Therefore, courts will continually have to confront new 
and often complicated issues that will arise from the popularity of these platforms.  Already, 
several prominent issues remain unresolved but may prove arduous to deal with in the near 
future.  
With the continual push for increased social interaction, one question that probably 
cannot be answered with an exact definition is what exactly constitutes a social media account.  
While sites like Facebook and Twitter clearly fall into this category, a line has not yet been 
drawn for other, less socially-focused content providers such as retail outlets like Amazon or 
gaming services like Steam or Xbox Live.  It remains unclear whether a discovery request 
seeking a litigant’s social media account information obligates that litigant to turn over the 
credentials to these types of platforms.  Amazon operates primarily as a retail agent but allows 
users to publish communications through reviews or other comments.  Gaming communities also 
contain significant communications that could prove valuable for opposing counsel.  If a party 
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claims extreme emotional distress but has been routinely and jubilantly participating in social 
gaming, opposing counsel would surely like access to any online communications that may 
divulge the true state of the complaining party’s mentality.  More and more websites and online 
platforms are offering some form of social interaction for users to accompany their primary 
services.  It is unclear whether these websites must be categorized as social media accounts for 
discovery purposes. 
Similarly, courts may have to define the scope of what constitutes a “document” for 
social media purposes.  In general, the discovery rules, both federal and often state, refer to 
discovery and relevancy of a document.  Rather than determining the relevancy of an entire 
collection of letters or other writings, the relevancy standard is generally applied on a document-
by-document basis.  While one letter or journal entry may be relevant, the rest of the collection 
may not be.  Courts have not determined what constitutes a document when social media 
evidence comes into play.  A post on Facebook, a single “Tweet” on Twitter, or even a blog 
entry can all constitute a document, but the issue become whether a collection of posts or blogs 
from a single day, hour, or month also constitute a document.  While it may not appear to be that 
significant of an issue, it comes into play when determining what a party should have to turn 
over in response to discovery requests and whether that party has the right to black-out or hide 
certain postings surrounding a post relevant to the issue at hand.   
 Additionally, courts will have to eventually deal with the potential consequences of 
allowing counsel complete to a party’s social media accounts if this trend were to continue.  By 
forcing an individual to turn over his or her login credentials, the integrity of that social media 
account can be compromised, either purposefully or unintentionally.  In today’s society, it is no 
secret that some individuals take great pride in their social media profiles and expend countless 
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hours building a reputation or achieving certain feats in their online arenas.  By submitting to a 
court order to turn over all login credentials, these individuals could be placing their online 
profiles at significant risk as a single accidental click could damage their online persona or even 
career. While integrity would ensure that nothing is done purposefully or vindictively, 
reparations such as sanctions may not be enough to repair a damaged profile, especially given the 
importance social media places on an online reputation.  
Another issue that has not yet taken center stage but surely has the potential to, involves a 
website’s terms of service and potential violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, an 
already muddied piece of legislation that has seen its fair share of criticism.  Under the Act an 
individual can be subject to significant criminal or civil liability for fraudulently accessing a 
computer “without authorization.”111  Additionally, if an attorney were to create a fake account 
to access an individual’s information the attorney would most likely be violating that service’s 
terms of service for providing false information, which would again have the potential of running 
afoul of the Act.  Whether an attorney could face culpability for attempting to access the social 
media accounts of an opposing party is unclear, but the broad and murky language of the act 
should put attorneys on notice that improper actions in the digital world are often not clearly 
defined but strictly punished.   
Given the nature of social media and the fact that it can be deleted with the click of a 
mouse, rather than imposing significant penalties like sanctions or adverse inference charges 
after the damage has been done, it would be a better practice for all courts to implement litigation 
holds as soon as possible.  This process would mandate that all parties retain social media 
postings or other electronically stored information that relates to the case at hand.  While this 
                                                          
111
 See 18 § 1030(a)(4), (a)(5)(B)(i-v), (g). 
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process already exists at the federal level, and has been adopted by some state courts as well,
112
 it 
should become uniform practice.  This would obviate a great deal of spoliation litigation that 
currently plagues the courts concerning this type of frequently inflammatory evidence.  
One of the often overlooked features of social media is the braggadocio that is often 
involved in the postings.  Opposing parties and courts will currently have to struggle with what is 
truthful and what is not, because what one sees on social media is not always the entire story.  
Social norms and general human nature encourage users to post more about the positive 
occurrences in their lives as opposed to the drab or dreary.  “Litigants’ internal sentiments do not 
necessarily manifest in observable form, and therefore emotionally damaged or remorseful 
litigants would likely not post pictorial evidence of their true feelings on Facebook.”113  This can 
lead to tricky situations during discovery and at trial.  As the Giachetto court recognized, “[t]he 
fact that an individual may express some degree of joy, happiness, or sociability on certain 
occasions sheds little light on the issue of whether he or she is actually suffering emotional 
distress.”114 
 Finally, with regard to attorney ethics and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
courts may have to specifically delineate what kind of speech actions like a “friend request” on 
Facebook or a “follow” on Twitter represents.  While it is clear that an attorney using a false 
profile to garner information is acting unethically, it has not yet been uniformly established 
whether using a personal account with true information could constitute deception or a 
misrepresentation.  This type of analysis would hinge on what a friend request or a follow 
actually means.  The ethics committees from New York and Philadelphia have already 
                                                          
112
 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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 Kathryn R. Brown, Note, “The Risks of Taking Facebook at Face Value: Why the Psychology of Social 
Networking Should Influence the Evidentiary Relevance of Facebook Photographs,” 14 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 
357, 381–82 (2012).   
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 2013 WL 2897054 at *8. 
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demonstrated divergent views as to the nature and intent inherent in sending a Facebook friend 
request.  A friend request on Facebook could mean that the individual wants to share in a 
legitimate social relationship online.  It could also mean that upon accepting the request, an 
individual is granting that new “friend” complete and unfettered access to a bevy of personal 
information even though the identity of the individual is unknown.  It all depends on how the act 
of sending the request is interpreted and the true meaning behind it.  Courts and bar associations 
must determine whether a friend request, sent from a personal account, can still be deceptive in 
that it materially misrepresents the relationship the attorney is establishing with the third party or 
fails to be forthcoming with all the material facts.  Each social media platform has its own 
terminology and methods for allowing users to share information.  There are Tweets, posts, 
blogs, likes, shares, retweets, subscriptions, and favorites, just to name a few.  Because it is 
unclear what these actions communicate to others, courts will continue to struggle with the 
ethical issues that social media presents.   
 The creation and commercialization of each new social media platform only creates more 
issues for the courts to confront.  While it remains to be seen how courts will continue to handle 
these issues, it is clear that the current digital era provides a bevy of information that will 
continue to be mined for litigation.  The only true weapon courts can wield in battling the 
confrontations that arise is a better understanding of the technology and the platforms being 
utilized.  Just as lawyers must keep abreast of the interplay between technology and the law, the 
legal system must also be held to the same standard.   
XI. Conclusion 
 Continued advances in technology may eventually force legislatures to draft new rules of 
discovery specifically tailored to social media, but until then courts will determine these 
discovery issues using the existing rules of discovery.  While this process has allowed courts to 
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maintain the status quo, attorneys have not been able to successfully escape the effects of the 
social media blitzkrieg on society.  With new rules of conduct and ethics being generated by bar 
associations in each state, responsible attorneys must understand and adapt to the issues the 
technology presents.  Failure to do so will jeopardize not only their clients’ cases but also their 
standing in the legal community.  The social media fervor is not fading, and its rise has forever 
altered the way people communicate on a daily basis.  Both attorneys and the judicial system as a 
whole will continue to feel its effects and must continue to adapt as the technology progresses 
and its legal use amplifies.   
 
